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 Abstract: 
This essay argues that experience from more than three decades of labour market 
forecasting shows that forecasting helps greasing the wheels of labour markets. 
Applied correctly – not in the sense of old fashioned manpower planning models - 
sufficiently disaggregated employment outlooks support individuals in making better 
informed decisions on human capital investments, guide policy makers, and alert 
firms of upcoming skill shortages. That forecasts are necessary at all follows mainly 
from nowadays widely acknowledged market failure arguments. 
Zusammenfassung: 
In einigen Ländern der OECD werden seit mehr als drei Jahrzehnten 
Arbeitsmarktprognosen erstellt. Die Erfahrungen zeigen, dass Prognosen, wenn sie 
nicht im Stil sogenannter ‚Manpower Planning’ Modelle interpretiert werden, 
durchaus die Funktionsfähigkeit von Arbeitsmärkten verbessern können. Hinreichend 
detaillierte Voraussagen zum Bedarf nach Berufsgruppen und Qualifikationen helfen 
bei individuellen Bildungsentscheidungen, unterstützen Politik, und informieren 
Firmen über möglichen Fachkräftemangel. Dass Prognosen überhaupt notwendig 
sind, folgt aus den heutzutage doch weitgehend anerkannten Arbeiten zum 
Marktversagen. 
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1. The world is changing: Adaptability of training and education 
systems 
Nowadays there is widespread consensus among scholars and policymakers that 
investments in human capital confer benefits to individuals, firms and societies. 
Better educated people have higher employment probabilities, are subject to a lower 
risk of unemployment and receive on average higher income (OECD, 1998). Positive 
effects from education also accrue in the forms of economic growth, social cohesion 
and lower crime. However, the benefits of a better trained workforce should not lead 
governments to support human capital investments irrespective of quality concerns. 
Even though education, training and lifelong learning policies seem to be a promising 
form of investment, resources need to be allocated in an efficient way. 
No doubt, this is a difficult task. Some scholars advocate the hypothesis that 
technological progress, societal changes, and internationalization of product, capital 
and labour markets continue to evolve largely parallel to each other, and some even 
argue that these processes have been speeding up. This view challenges training 
and employment systems and the links between the two systems. Adaptability of the 
latter system, involving individual employees and firms as well as their 
representatives, such as trade unions and employers’ organizations, is decisive for 
achieving and maintaining prosperous economies. A successful policy has to take 
into account that education, training and lifelong learning policies must respond to 
shifts in the demand for skills and qualifications flexibly, and in due time. 
The challenges are not restricted to policymakers. In addition to the need to 
reshape institutions, individuals and firms must face new challenges, too. Structural 
shifts in the demand for labour will require permanent updates of the know-how and 
employability of employees and of the knowledge management of firms. The insight 
that lifelong learning ensures employability is a key element of any strategic 
response. An adequately trained and educated workforce will contribute to individual 
wealth, will make firms more competitive and is to the advantage of societies at large 
because of large spillover effects.  
Even though there seems to be a wide consensus on the importance of a highly 
qualified labour force, future skill and qualification needs are uncertain. Policymakers 
and social partners generally agree that vocational training, higher education and 
                                            
1 We would like to thank Hans Heijke, Günther Schmid and Jerry Sexton for their comments on an 
earlier version. Christian Brzinsky, Josef Forster and Janine Leschke provided efficient research 
assistance. Thanks are due to all contributors to the book 'Forecasting Labour Markets in OECD 
Countries, Measuring and Tackling Mismatches’ as well as to the participants of a preparatory 
workshop in November 1999 at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).  
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further training are important. But none of them can justify promoting one type of 
training over the other. And if they do so, one sometimes wonders how they know. 
What about scientists? Do they know? Well, there are some rather pessimistic 
colleagues who claim ‘that there are two types of forecasters . . . those who don’t 
know and those who don’t know that they don’t know’ (James Galbraith). Of course, 
this makes us smile. However, we do not agree.  
One of the key lessons to be learned from (Neugart and Schömann 2002) is that 
forecasts very likely will not eliminate cycles in the demand and supply of skills. 
However, instead of the frequent fire-fighting role performed by policymakers, 
forecasts enable a more strategic approach to identifying and subsequently solving 
problems. In this way forecasts may help to reduce adjustment costs arising from 
imbalances on the labour and product markets. 
The contributions of Sexton (2002) and Barnow (2002) show that these forecasts 
have indeed delivered valid and useful information on labour market trends. Now that 
labour market forecasts have been made in some countries for several decades, it is 
probably fair to claim that many developments have occurred as predicted, even 
though some forecasts have failed to predict employment trends in specific areas. 
Thus, we do not wish to omit the fact that forecasts may also react sensitively to the 
underlying assumptions on the growth path, which are usually derived from 
macroeconomic forecasts.  
However, if forecasts are restricted to sufficiently large classes of occupational 
groups, and if forecasts are not misused as point predictors, then they may 
reasonably be employed for broad policy-guiding purposes, particularly in fields with 
extended educational tracks, such as those for university-trained engineers, 
teachers, medical doctors or other highly skilled professionals. Likewise, information 
is needed on labour market trends for middle-level skills, because labour shortages 
or excess supply in specific sectors, educational classes and occupational groups 
frequently can be observed. Therefore, forecasts tend to be restricted to sufficiently 
large classes of occupational groups or so-called familles professionnelles, which 
can be translated as groupings of occupational groups with large overlaps in required 
skills. Perhaps this shared wisdom of many forecasters builds on the experience of 
another eminent scholar, Sir Maynard Keynes, who is quoted as having said: ‘I’d 
rather be vaguely right than precisely wrong’. 
Forecasts not only provide some occupational guidance for new labour market 
entrants but also address the need or potential for occupational mobility for those 
already in a job or those seeking to re-enter the labour market. Retraining to enhance 
occupational mobility, in particular, is a costly affair for both firms and employees. In 
the event of market failure due to insufficient information or incorrect expectations, 
public policies might step in. This is current practice in many OECD countries, 
particularly in the case of countries with high levels of unemployment which also 
have to be financed through higher contributions or taxes.  
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Having addressed the question of whether we could know, there may still be the 
question of ‘Do we really have to know?’ After all, markets clear. Relative wages, 
labour supply and demand will adjust so that no excess supply or demand will 
persist. What, then, is the value added of forecasting labour market trends? 
2. Why not rely on market mechanisms alone? 
We answer with a rhetorical question: Do markets really clear? And if so, in due 
time? Nowadays, it is widely recognized among labour economists that market 
mechanisms themselves can contribute to imbalances on the labour market. A 
prominent example is efficiency wage theories (surveyed by Yellen, 1984, and 
Schmid, 1989). The shirking approach (see, for example, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) 
is one attempt in this strand of literature to explain under which conditions the wage 
may not clear the labour market. These models postulate that wages may have to 
fulfil other tasks rather than serve as a market clearing device alone. This other role 
stems from asymmetric information between employers and employees. Firms may 
not have perfect control over workers. In overcoming the incentive problem of not 
being in a position to know whether workers perform their jobs properly, firms will 
look for appropriate incentives. The wage or access to further training may be such a 
tool. Firms use it as a device to raise the productivity of workers. Employers view 
wages not only as a cost factor. Rather, they face a trade-off between low wage 
costs and low worker productivity on the one hand, and paying higher wages to 
employees to make them work harder on the other. From the perspective of the firms 
it is optimal to pay a wage that is higher than the market clearing wage. It gives the 
optimal mix of wage costs and induced effort to arrive at higher productivity. 
However, higher wages create unemployment. There are people around who are 
willing to work under the prevailing conditions but who are not offered a job, because 
it simply is not to the advantage of the firms. In addition to arguments for shirking, 
efficiency wages may also be reasoned on the grounds of turnover costs (Salop, 
1979; Schlicht, 1978) or a fair wage hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). In any 
case, the wage as a market clearing device is blocked.  
Other examples of theories in which wages may not adjust to clear the labour 
market are implicit wage contracts (Azariadis, 1975; Baily, 1974; Gordon, 1974) and 
seniority wage profiles (Lazear, 1981). Wage profiles in which workers with little firm 
experience are paid less than their marginal product but receive wages in excess of 
their individual productivity when firm tenure increases are also based on asymmetric 
information between the employer and the employees. Firms seek an incentive 
device that ensures optimal effort by workers. Because it would not be advantageous 
for the young to shirk, as they would then relinquish the premiums in the future, 
seniority wage profiles may solve incentive problems from asymmetric information. 
However, this comes at the cost of lower wage flexibility. 
4  
With implicit wages employees insure themselves against the business cycle. 
Workers are assumed to be more risk averse than firms because their human capital 
is embodied, that is, it cannot be separated from the worker and sold. Therefore, they 
accept a markdown on the wage relative to productivity in exchange for employment 
and wage stability—in other words: a steady income stream. In all three examples, 
efficiency wages, seniority wage profiles and implicit contracts, the wage mechanism 
as a market clearing device will not work properly, if at all. Imbalances in the supply 
and demand for labour which potentially are irrespective of skill level will vanish only 
slowly, or even persist. 
In addition to labour market slack that originates from the functioning of markets 
themselves, we must take into account institutions that govern labour markets and 
their dynamic features. We do not wish to get into the discussion of whether labour 
market regulations are well suited or necessary at all. In our opinion this would 
require a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. That is clearly beyond the scope of 
our essay. Rather, let us take those labour market regulations at face value and ask 
only what impact they have on the speed of adjustment when imbalances occur. This 
will necessarily be a one-sided view, neglecting the other column of the balance 
sheet that—taking collective wage bargaining agreements as an example—would 
contain benefits such as a reduction in the transaction costs. Collective wage 
bargaining systems exist in many industrialized countries. Even though unionization 
may be low, union coverage can be sizeable, with many firms joining the collective 
agreements subsequently (Nickell, 1997). Because wages generally are bargained 
for every year or once every two years, wages may not adjust quickly enough to 
avoid labour market imbalances. Insider–outsider theories even claim that the 
incumbent workforce may be so powerful (through various channels; see Blanchard 
and Summers, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988; Solow, 1985) that wages are set 
by them.  
The market clearing mechanism may also suffer from rather centralized national 
wage bargaining systems if these systems are unable to take into account sectorial 
changes. If wages in declining sectors are restricted from below, relative wage 
changes between rising and declining sectors may be too small to induce labour 
mobility between sectors. Alternatively, the same mechanism might spur more job 
growth in the case of reduced wage growth in prospering sectors which have wage 
growth below productivity increases due to national compromises or so-called pacts 
for employment.  
But low mobility between industrial sectors may not only be due to collective 
wage agreements that slow down wage adjustments. Workers who are not well 
informed may also contribute to sluggish labour mobility, fostering labour market 
imbalances (Lilien and Hall, 1986). Just assume that for whatever reason workers do 
not know whether reduced demand is a temporary phenomenon or related to 
sectorial shifts. If they believe in the former while the latter is true, they will not move 
to another sector but rather wait for recovery. Especially if mobility costs are non-
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negligible, waiting can be the preferred option, slowing down the speed of labour 
market adjustment.  
An alternative explanation for low job mobility between sectors of the economy is 
given by Hall (1975). Consider an economy that has two sectors: a declining high-
wage sector, for example manufacturing, and a rising low-wage sector, say, services. 
Even if wages adjust to clear the low-wage sector instantaneously, excess supply in 
the manufacturing sector may persist. Workers may decide to stay unemployed and 
go on searching rather than accept a job in the low-wage sector right away. 
Job-search effects leading to persistent imbalances on the labour market have 
also been linked to welfare state arrangements (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998). As 
long as economic times are not turbulent, unemployment compensation for those 
who have lost their job may have no detrimental effects on the functioning of the 
labour market. A sufficient number of new jobs coming to the market compensates 
for the negative effects on the job-search activity of programmes for the unemployed. 
However, if shocks are large, generous support may lengthen the transition period, 
generating long unemployment spells. Then unemployment compensation may 
destroy the incentives to quickly pick up a new job for which new skills could be 
accumulated. 
Sectorial mobility may also suffer from occupations being too narrowly defined 
and from overly strong identification with a specific occupation, which might hinder 
job mobility to other occupational groups or similar occupations in other industrial 
sectors. No matter what our reasoning or beliefs are about where the driving forces 
of sectorial mobility come from, empirically we do not observe considerable 
elasticities for sectorial and occupational mobility (Freeman, 1986). 
Table 1 sheds some light on the dynamics of European labour markets by simply 
looking at occupational and sectorial distributions of employment. This cross-
tabulation of sector of economic activity by major occupational group for 15 member 
states of the European Union summarises changes from 1995 to 2000 based on 
calculations for each member state of the European Union. Within the European 
Union countries with a high job growth rate, such as the Scandinavian countries, 
Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal, reach the highest rates of change between 
occupations and economic sectors when comparing simple percentage distributions.  
Most of the general trends in the European Union are well known and do not 
come as a surprise. Skilled agricultural jobs as well as jobs in the military services 
have shrunk in number over the five-year period (see columns in Table 1). The 
largest increases are found among technicians and professionals. Comparing across 
occupations within a sector of economic activities (see rows in Table 1), we find the 
trade and finance category with the strongest gains. This sector comprises 
wholesale/retail trade and hotels/restaurants as well as banking, insurance and real 
estate intermediation. Remarkable as well is the absolute sum of job shifts behind the 
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structural change between 1995 and 2000. A positive balance of 8.5 million new jobs 
has been created. Individual job mobility is of course much higher because this 
average figure on the structural change masks processes at the individual level such 
as year-to-year mobility, labour market entries, and temporary and permanent exits 
from the labour force. 
Let us now turn to a final example of slow adjustment processes. Time-series 
evidence on the demand for education reveals quite large fluctuations in enrolment 
rates to higher education. This holds true for many fields of study and across many 
countries. The demand for education was analysed with time-series data on the basis 
of rationally forecasting agents (Siow, 1984; Zarkin, 1983, 1985) as well as with 
dynamic regression models in which agents have backward-looking expectations 
(Borghans, de Grip and Heijke, 1996; Freeman, 1975, 1976; Quinn and Price, 1998). 
There seems to be no agreement so far about how these cycles in the demand for 
education can be explained best. No matter what kind of expectations are employed, 
rather large and perpetual shocks are needed to generate ongoing cycles as they 
can be found in the data. However, if one believes in the explanation that relies on 
backward-looking expectations of agents, then cycles in the demand for education 
may at least partly be driven by internal market structures. Then cobweb-type ups 
and downs, which indicate persistent fluctuations in the demand for education, would 
be generated by backward-looking beliefs of first-year students, and exogenous 
productivity shocks may play some additional role.  
The time-series analyses that employ backward-looking expectations lack an 
explanation of why agents predict returns on education using current and past labour 
market information. Very likely, they would be better off taking into account all 
available information, including knowledge about the future. A possible answer to this 
question is that access to information is costly for individuals, which leads to their 
preference for ‘cheap’ prediction rules. Their forecasting behaviour may only change 
if experiences of previous cohorts signal that the past is not a good predictor for 
returns on education to come. With the switch of prediction rules, fluctuations in the 
demand for education can be explained endogenously (Neugart and Tuinstra, 2001). 
Costly access to labour market information destabilizes the system. Or, reversing the 
argument, reducing individuals’ costs for collecting and processing information about 
future trends in the labour market may eliminate cycles (ceteris paribus, which does 
not consider variations driven by exogenous shocks). 
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Table 1 Changes (1995–2000) of active population in the EU by occupations and economic 
sectors 
ISCO by        
NACE Managers Professionals Technicians Clerks/sales 
Skilled 
agricultural 
workers 
Operators Security Total Activity rate 
Agric./fishing -60,798 -31,227 -47,455 -132,547 -641,359 -250,998 -1,559 -1,165,944 -1.07% 
Construct/min 190,848 -2,937 27,341 -113,365 2,240 442,269 -1,726 544,670 -0.17% 
Manufacturing 95,476 139,790 361,974 -166,439 -0,046 404,883 -4,693 830,945 -0.62% 
Trade/finance -460,144 749,690 844,064 2,845,778 11,646 958,600 -10,993 4,938,641 1.69% 
Administration 188,019 61,051 362,464 -47,318 9,553 -195,277 2,289 380,780 -0.20% 
Education 15,693 345,862 278,909 168,715 -2,501 -14,329 2,855 795,205 0.15% 
Health/social 32,397 218,443 871,556 538,157 2,841 66,675 -2,383 1,727,684 0.63% 
Associations 265,516 67,677 -12,518 -445,819 10,866 501,317 -2,392 384,647 -0.40% 
Total 267,009 1,548,348 2,686,335 2,647,162 -606,761 1,913,140 -18,603 8,436,630   
Occupation rate -0.29% 0.53% 0.79% 0.26% -0.63% -0.61% -0.05%     
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Survey, 1995 and 2000, own calculations 
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Expectation formation appears to be a field that has not been explored very well 
in economics (see also Manski, 1993, for this argument). This is even more 
astonishing considering that the way agents form expectations is decisive for their 
human capital investment decisions. The survey evidence that we are aware of on 
wage expectations of young university students reports substantial overestimation of 
future earnings. Students believe that their starting salaries will be higher than what 
they actually will earn. The individual guesses are more than 10 per cent higher than 
actual wages (Betts, 1996; Brunello, Lucifera and Winter-Ebmer, 2001). Other 
evidence on wage expectations shows that alumni report lower levels when working 
in large firms than senior students expect to earn (Carvajal et al., 2000). Given that 
wages are an important decision variable, those students whose expectations about 
wages turn out to be wrong would rather have chosen some other subject for study 
or invested less in their human capital. As access to information is obviously not 
perfect, agents receive biased signals on the worthiness of investments into 
education. The market mechanism fails to allocate resources efficiently. 
Even though we are not aware of evidence on expectation failures for different 
educational groups, one may reasonably surmise that relative costs of expectation 
failures as estimated for college students are actually even higher for groups with 
lower levels of education. The reason is that those groups in the labour market may 
have more limited access to information through relevant social networks and 
modern communication technologies such as the Internet. 
3 The consequences of labour market imbalances 
A range of issues worthy of our attention follows from (persistent) imbalances on 
labour markets. We report here on consequences with respect to nominal wages, 
productivity levels and growth, effects arising from educational and skill mismatches, 
low wage–low skill equilibria and product quality, all of which may be caused by 
labour supply or demand shortages in specific labour market segments. 
Standard labour market theory tells us that labour supply shortages cause 
upward pressure on wages. Firms searching for certain types of labour may have to 
offer higher wages to attract workers. Skill shortages may also induce the incumbent 
workforce to bargain for higher wages. Although excess demand in a certain sector 
very likely raises the wage, the overall effect with respect to the economy-wide wage 
level is unclear. Excess demand in one sector may be accompanied by excess 
supply in another sector. For example, if there is a sectorial shift towards high-skilled 
labour, then the low-skilled labour supply will exceed demand. Wages in this sector 
may fall. The composite effect can be either positive or negative. The question must 
be answered empirically. Econometric evidence (see Haskel and Martin, 1996) 
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suggests that skill shortages may have a positive effect on nominal wage growth. 
When factors like productivity, unions, unemployment or firm market power were 
controlled for, it was found that nominal wage growth would have been one 
percentage point lower each year between 1983 and 1989 had there been no skill 
shortages in the United Kingdom. 
Skill or educational mismatches have also been found to affect wage levels. 
Individuals with a certain education generally have lower wages in a job that does not 
match their educational background than another person with the same education 
who has a job that does match his or her educational background. Moreover, an 
overeducated person will earn more than another person in the same job who has an 
educational background matching the job requirements (see, for example, Hartog, 
2000; Sicherman, 1991). In the case of undereducation, workers earn more than if 
their educational background and the job requirements were to match, but less than 
when the job is occupied by somebody who is educated for that job. Usually the 
wage effects of overeducation are stronger than those of undereducation; however, 
both concepts are difficult to measure empirically with high precision.  
The results from education–job mismatch studies are partly robust against skill 
mismatch specifications. Wage effects persist, even though they do become smaller. 
Positive effects for on-the-job search also are reported. What is contrary to education 
mismatch studies is that skill mismatches seem to have a strong negative effect on 
job satisfaction (Allen and van der Velden, 2001). This strand of literature 
demonstrates that labour market imbalances may cause bad job matches. 
Although many would consider labour market imbalances temporary, the 
literature on multiple equilibria emphasises that economies may get stuck at various 
states depending on their histories. Some of these perhaps rather stable equilibria 
can be more desirable for a society than others. Finegold and Soskice (1988) 
described a mechanism that may lead to a low skill–low wage equilibrium.2 Assume 
that for some reason a skill shortage arises. Then firms may have problems hiring 
workers for high-skill jobs. If there is some complementarity between production 
factors they will eventually invest in technologies that supplement the low-skilled 
workforce. The labour market will be characterized by low wages. Furthermore, firms 
will not post vacancies for high-skilled workers. As there are no well-paid jobs on the 
market, workers will stop investing in their human capital. The vicious circle will drive 
the economy into a low wage–low skill equilibrium. There are other, more 
advantageous equilibria. But for the individual there is no incentive to invest in 
education, as the payoffs will not materialize. Considerable efforts are required, 
efforts that only a powerful actor in the market can accomplish. That is where the 
government could come into play, perhaps by subsidizing education or by avoiding 
labour supply shortages right from the beginning through forecasts and appropriate 
policies tackling upcoming skill shortages. 
                                            
2 For a more formal treatment of the argument, see Snower (1996). 
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If there are skill shortages firms may switch to filling high-skill vacancies with low-
skill workers, lowering productivity. It may also happen that a shift in the bargaining 
strength towards workers leads to employment conditions that are less efficient for 
firms and that lower the productivity of the incumbent workforce. The former 
argument addresses productivity levels, but productivity growth also may suffer from 
skill shortages if firms reduce investments in research and development. The findings 
by Haskel and Martin (1996) suggest that skill shortages reduced productivity growth 
by 0.4 per cent per year in the United Kingdom between 1983 and 1989. Cross-
country evidence from panel data sets reveals that the average number of years of 
school attainment at secondary and higher levels has a positive effect on economic 
growth. The relationship is even more important quantitatively if variables are used 
that measure schooling quality (Barro, 2001). Interpreting the results, the author 
conjectured that the absorption of new technologies might be easier with people who 
have obtained relatively more education at the secondary and higher levels. The 
international migration of highly skilled people and green card initiatives find their 
justification in this kind of reasoning. 
We conclude our list of examples on potentially undesirable consequences from 
labour market imbalances by arguing that the lack of skilled workers may lead to 
malfunctions in production processes. Quality control may suffer and, consequently, 
product quality may decrease (Finegold and Soskice, 1988). Haskel and Holt (1999) 
discussed evidence on whether skill shortages affect product quality. From a sample 
of case studies they concluded that product quality may indeed suffer, but perhaps 
only in some sectors. 
Doubting the market mechanisms, should we trust policymakers? Can they 
develop and implement appropriate training and education policies, once they know 
about labour market trends? As we have demonstrated, the list of market failures is 
long. But policy failures have also been occurring. So, which horse should we bet 
on? One possibility is to make information on labour market trends accessible to 
potential users so that people can make better informed decisions. Policymakers 
certainly should be concerned about this aspect. The contributions in Neugart and 
Schömann (2002) report on the important topic of how information is disseminated. In 
many countries, public employment offices provide job counselling services and 
allocate unemployed workers to training schemes. Do they have proper forecasts on 
what people should be trained in? Do responsible teachers in schools know? Is there 
an up-to-date Web site that tells us what jobs we should aim for? In which segments 
of the labour market should firms be aware of likely shortages in the near future?  
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4. Why labour market forecasts are a public good 
Forecasts on labour markets are a public good (see also Smith, 2002). The reason is 
simple. Very likely, individuals and firms cannot be excluded from the use of 
information that labour market forecasts produce. Not all users can be forced to pay 
a price and contribute to the development costs of forecasting models and the 
production of forecasts. Indeed, the costs incurred when developing a forecasting 
model are not negligible. Comprehensive microlevel and macrolevel data sets are 
needed; the estimation of the models is not trivial, nor are the development costs. 
Hence, if the use of the information cannot be restricted to those groups that actually 
pay for it, there will be no incentive to pay for the information. Consequently, no 
profit-oriented organization will provide such information. For example, no consulting 
firm that may have thought about setting up a forecasting model and selling forecasts 
to individuals, employment offices, training companies or firms enters the market. 
However, even though it is optimal from a private perspective not to produce 
information on labour market trends, the situation is not optimal from the perspective 
of society as a whole. The society at large can gain from adequate and timely labour 
market information. Here the role for public agencies or governments comes in. If a 
government agency is capable of providing the service, the functioning of the labour 
market may improve in the sense of better matches or faster adjustments to 
structural changes. 
5. Who uses the information 
In 1998 OECD countries spent almost 0.9 per cent of their gross domestic product on 
active labour market policies. Of that amount 25 per cent went into training policies 
(OECD, 2001). Clearly, this is a considerable amount of money. Knowing about 
future shortages in the supply of certain occupations and skills as well as demand 
shortages would surely help to allocate those funds more efficiently. This especially 
holds true if one takes into account that evaluation studies have shown only limited 
success of public training programmes so far with respect to the reemployment 
probabilities of participants (Martin, 2000; OECD, 1993; Rabe, 2000). In many of the 
countries where labour market forecasts are made on a regular basis, information is 
disseminated to public employment offices. We do not know of any evaluation study 
that has investigated whether employment offices supplied with information on labour 
market developments allocate people to training measures more efficiently. This 
constitutes a fruitful area for future research on matching processes on the labour 
market.  
Recent evidence suggests that there is a lack of sound information about in 
which sectors and occupations participants of training measures are most likely to 
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find well-paid jobs (Schömann and O’Connell 2002). This observation finds support in 
recommendations for labour market policymakers. There it is generally 
acknowledged that having an eye on the demand side of the market while training 
people improves the effectiveness of programmes (Schmid 2001, O’Connell and 
McGinnity 2002). 
A broad range of other potential users exists. This is documented by Neugart 
and Schömann (2002) and emphasised by Heijke (1996). The list of potential and 
current users of information on the labour market can be extended far beyond 
employment offices. In fact, forecasting in a systematic fashion began in the United 
States when a large number of soldiers came back from World War II and the 
government was concerned about where these people could find jobs (see Barnow, 
2002). Since then it has also played a major role in immigration policies in the United 
States and Canada, a role which many European countries have omitted until very 
recently. In the case of the United States the information on which occupations and 
skills to look for among potential immigrants also comes from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics forecasts on future skill shortages. In the European Union, where the 
debate on an economically motivated immigration policy only recently began, it 
became clear rather quickly that a solid understanding of future skill needs is 
frequently still lacking. In most European Union countries only vague ideas exist 
about how quotas on types of occupations and qualifications could be derived.  
In most countries schools, vocational training systems, universities and other 
types of higher education are run as public institutions. Even in countries that host 
greater shares of privately run schools, governments play a major role in the 
education system. Total public and private spending on education among OECD 
countries averaged 6.3 per cent of gross domestic product in 1994 (OECD, 1998, 
2001), of which about four-fifths was public money. It is probably not farfetched to 
say that while funding these organizations, the government wants to see a return on 
education. At some point voters will judge governments’ policies. Parents of young 
children will be embarrassed if they find schools in a bad condition or underequipped, 
or if their children are taught in crowded classes because there are not enough 
trained teachers. Such a situation will not only eventually upset parents against the 
ruling parties; it is also acknowledged that capacity constraints at schools which lead 
to a high number of pupils per individual teacher are likely to generate lower returns 
to schooling. The same rationale holds for young students entering universities who 
find themselves in crowded seminars. This is likely to lead to longer average study 
times. Students will therefore enter the labour market later. Individual returns on 
education will materialize with delay, as will social returns. Holding excess capacity to 
avoid capacity constraints is a costly option. From this point of view it would be more 
desirable to stabilize flows into education, which also reduces adjustment costs for 
teaching capacity. 
Although most sociological studies argue that transitions to higher education are 
still mainly driven by effects of parental backgrounds (Albert, Davia, Hernanz and 
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Toharia, 2002), there is also evidence that income considerations matter. Lifetime 
income is at the heart of human capital models (Becker, 1975). Survey data show 
that career motives and income considerations play a significant role in individuals’ 
decisions on human capital investments (Heublein and Sommer, 2000). Hence, 
individuals will have an interest in studies on labour market developments. Excess 
supply in their fields of study will dampen their individual employment probabilities at 
the time of graduation. The probability of finding a job and expected income seem to 
be major determinants in the demand for education. If they are sufficiently accurate, 
forecasts on labour market developments may contribute to a reduction in 
uncertainties about the returns to education.  
In human capital models in which agents have perfect foresight, the effect of 
uncertainty on the demand for education is ambiguous (Levhari and Weiss, 1974). 
However, under certain assumptions on agents’ preferences, demand for education 
will decline with more uncertainty about the returns on educational investments 
(Snow and Warren, 1990). Econometric studies cannot always establish the 
theoretically predicted signs in the demand for education when returns are risky 
(Kodde, 1986). However, should it actually be the case that uncertain returns lower 
investments into higher education, professional and reliable forecasts may spur 
human capital investments. 
Finally, where those forecasts are available, firms have been using them. 
Shortages in the supply of labour usually cause costly bottlenecks for companies. We 
already stressed that they may face higher costs from upward wage pressure, 
declining product quality, less skilled or too few workers and, in a longer perspective, 
lower market share growth and the inability to enter new markets. Clearly, knowing 
about future shortages will help firms as they take measures to ensure that they have 
an appropriate workforce. Although for big firms the benefits from having a 
forecasting model may outweigh the costs of development and production, small- 
and medium-sized enterprises will very likely suffer from the investment-cost trap. In 
these cases, and taking into consideration the arguments on forecasts as a public 
good, government provision of labour market information may be desirable from the 
perspective of society as a whole. 
6. Previous approaches and some alternatives 
There is a long history of forecasting labour market developments in OECD 
countries. One of the first ‘Manpower Planning Projects’ was the Mediterranean 
Regional Project initiated by the OECD in the early 1960s (Parnes, 1962). Within this 
project the ‘manpower requirement approach’ was developed. In those days the idea 
was to use forecasts for planning purposes. Given economic targets, such as the 
growth path of the economy, labour requirements in terms of various occupations 
and qualifications were derived. Compared with rather simplistic projections of the 
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supply side of the economy, this approach was to assist policymakers in the 
determination of education and training policies necessary to achieve the targets for 
economic growth. 
These approaches have been widely criticized (see, for example, Ahamad and 
Blaug, 1973), in part because of aspects of the methodology employed, but also 
because of the economic targets used. Many see economic growth as detrimental to 
the environment, exploiting natural resources to the cost of future generations. With 
respect to the methodological issues, it has been argued that the lack of good data 
and the poorly elaborated models would render forecasts with longer horizons 
impossible. The models were seen as purely mechanistic because they did not take 
into account substitution processes on the labour market between sectors and 
occupations. The fixed coefficients employed to relate sectorial growth to labour 
demand were said to be too inflexible a tool to sketch a reliable picture of future 
labour demand. It was also brought forward that these early models did not consider 
interactions between supply and demand. The criticism led to the conclusion that 
these models are unable to produce useful forecasts. Furthermore, a mere forecast 
on the need for certain occupations would not say much about the contents of the 
training and education policies needed. 
The critique induced a discussion about flexibility and ‘key skills’, and it also 
instigated a revision of the aims of what should be achieved through the manpower 
planning approach, especially with respect to the potential use of the results. 
However, despite these early disappointments, and the criticisms, governments 
retained an interest in manpower forecasting issues. Model-builders have responded 
to the criticisms by reducing the forecasting period from the long term to the medium 
term and by switching the focus of the forecasts from detailed educational planning to 
the provision of more general strategic guidelines. With regard to the latter, 
forecasters now emphasise that their main objectives are to highlight the implications 
of existing occupational trends; to provide information for governments and 
policymakers on the sort of changes which are likely to occur in the occupational 
profile of the labour force, as well as on the broad implications of these changes for 
educational, training and employment policies; and to provide information which 
facilitates career choices to society in general. 
Besides model-based forecasts, many other tools have been tested and applied 
to predict labour market developments. One such tool is interviews with employers, 
human resource managers and their representative bodies. Certainly, all these other 
approaches have their shortcomings, too. In surveys employers may strategically 
overstate their need for qualified labour in order to signal urgent demand to 
policymakers. This probably happened in Germany just recently, when the debate on 
working permits for information technology specialists started, and the government 
was unsure about how many permits should be issued. There may also be a problem 
of conflicting underlying assumptions in the answers of firms. Certainly, all firms have 
some projection of market share growth in mind when deriving their demand for 
labour. Let us assume that all plan to increase their market share. Naturally, this is 
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something that will not happen. But because the assumptions underlie the firms’ 
projections, labour demand forecasts from surveys will be biased upward.  
Given the high degree of uncertainty that also accompanies labour market 
forecasts based on macroeconometric models, it would be rather ignorant to exclude 
results from other forecasts for the assessment of future labour market trends. 
Methodologically different approaches may serve as checks and balances..3 
7. Overview of forecasting models, methodologies and related 
policy debates 
Neugart and Schömann (2002) present individual country forecasts for a number of 
OECD countries with the aim of identifying best-practice examples in terms of 
modelling approaches, specific methodologies applied, and features of use and 
implementation structures in these countries. In most categories of comparisons the 
models have common features. For example, most countries use a time horizon of 
between five and ten years in the forecasts (see Table 2). This practice should 
safeguard to some extent against the possibility of strong influences of recent short-
term effects or vintage and seasonal effects. The aim of these forecasts is therefore 
directed towards medium-term structural changes largely independent of short-term 
business cycle effects. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that the availability of 
annual data, the basis of most forecasts, also means that a time lag of at least one 
year to produce the forecast—data for 2001 will only be available in the summer of 
2002—is inherent in the statistical model.  
In order to overcome the time-lag problem and to be able to assess the impact of 
short-term developments, many countries have opted for a yearly or biannual update 
of the forecasts. About a third of the countries that Neugart and Schömann (2002) 
consider still produce irregular updates according to the specific needs of 
policymakers or every five years until new forecasts are produced, taking the risk of 
using outdated information and forecasts in public policy debates on economic, 
structural and occupational change (see Table 2). 
                                            
3 See Tessaring (1998) and Wilson (2001) for an introduction to a wide range of approaches to 
forecasting needs for qualifications and occupations. The broad range of approaches used in 
France and Germany has recently been demonstrated in an edited volume by Schömann (2001) as 
part of the research network www.frequenz.net, which so far is available only in French and 
German.  
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Table 2.  Overview of projections  
 Austria Canada France Germany Great Britain 
Time horizon 2000–2005 2000–2004 2000–2010 1999–2010 2001–2006/2010 
Interval for updates Irregular in past 5 years Irregular 5 years 1 year 
Major data sources Census and census sample, 
socio-economic database, 
national accounts, 
companies’ databases, 
micro-data from 
unemployment insurance 
and social security systems 
Census,  
monthly labour force survey 
Labour force survey,  
national accounts 
Labour force survey, 
national accounts, social 
security records 
 
Census, 
labour force survey 
combined with industrial 
data for employment status 
and gender, derived from 
establishment-based 
surveys 
Who pays for the  
forecast? 
Labour Ministry (HRDC) Ministry of Employment in 
internal research service 
department 
Federal and regional 
governments 
The research institute 
originally funded by the 
Department for Education 
and Employment 
Who does the forecast? Independent research 
institutes  
(WIFO, IHS) 
Independent research 
institutes; federal forecasts 
are supplemented by 
regional and sectorial 
forecasts  
Statistical and Economic 
Research Department of the 
French Ministry of 
Employment 
(DARES) 
Independent research 
institutes and federal 
research institutes 
Independent research 
institute (IER) 
 
Who uses the forecast? There doesn’t seem to be a 
high demand for formal 
forecasting results. 
Federal government for 
training programmes; sector 
councils to assess training 
needs, develop curricula 
and occupational standards 
and evaluate effectiveness 
of training efforts; career 
counsellors and individuals  
State and regional 
government, social partners 
and specialized committees 
Mostly for governmental use Policymakers; sub-models 
exist which allow policy 
simulations on the regional 
level 
Implementation Only weak implementation 
of results; quality 
assessment through 
informal knowledge and 
knowledge of practitioners 
Federal Labour Ministry, 
Provincial Ministries of 
Education or Labour 
Ministries 
National Ministry of 
Education and regional 
governments in charge of 
further training policies 
Differences in the 
implementation between 
regions; no close links for 
the use of regional and 
national forecasts  
Department for Education 
and Employment delegates 
responsibility to profit-
making local partners that 
receive public funding; non-
corporatist approach 
Other features (access to 
the forecasts, 
particularities of the 
forecasts) 
Special short-term 
quantitative prognosis for 
the apprenticeship market 
Widespread use of 
forecasts; hardcover and 
Internet version; CD-ROMs 
are distributed to schools  
Links between education 
and labour ministries in 
implementation fostered 
Limited transparency and 
accessibility  
Additional special survey on 
skill shortages 
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 Ireland  Japan Netherlands Spain  USA 
Time horizon 2000–2005 1998–2010 2001–2006 2000–2010 2000–2010 
Interval for updates 2 years 5 years 2 years Irregular 2 years 
Major data sources Annual labour force survey, 
quarterly national household 
survey  
Census, basic survey of 
employment structure 
 
Labour force survey Labour force survey and 
national accounts 
Census, labour force data, 
employment statistics 
Who pays for the 
forecast? 
National Employment and 
Training Authority (FÁS) 
Ministry of Labour  Ministries of Research, 
Labour and Agriculture; 
Central Employment Board; 
LDC Expertise  Centre for 
Career Issues 
Foundation, and a regional 
government in case of 
regional forecasts 
Ministry of Labour 
Who does the forecast? Independent research 
institute (ESRI) 
 
Research Committee for 
Employment Policy  
Independent research 
centre (ROA) 
 
Research institute  Statistical Institute of the 
Ministry of Labor  (BLS) 
Who uses the forecast? Government and state 
agencies for planning 
employment and education    
policies; guidance for 
science, technology and 
innovation policies; firms 
and trade unions; career 
counsellors; individuals  
One of the major resources 
for the discussion of 
employment measures  
Ministries of Research, 
Labour and Agriculture; 
individuals for educational 
choices; firms to forecast 
supply shortages; 
employment offices 
Little established discussion 
beyond expert groups so far  
Government agencies for 
training, education and 
immigration policies; career 
counsellors; firms; 
individuals  
Implementation Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment; 
Department of Education 
and Science; social partners 
are represented on the 
board of FÁS   
Government, social partners  Much involvement of social 
partners in planning and 
design of qualification 
profiles 
Mostly through national 
training institute and local 
governments 
Responsibility on the state 
level 
Other features  
(access to the forecasts, 
particularities of the 
forecasts) 
Gender sub-model Large governmental 
commission presents 
results and spurs public 
debate; part of the 
economic outlook debate 
Besides the general 
occupational outlooks, the 
perspectives of school-
leavers are shown 
Simple macro-economic 
projection methods to derive 
a baseline projection for skill 
needs 
Much of the material can be 
obtained from the  Internet; 
every state is required to 
produce state employment 
projections 
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The basic data sources for the forecasts are quite similar across the whole range of 
countries represented in this volume. Most analysts use annual labour force survey 
data, sometimes also called micro-census data, to achieve a sufficient level of 
disaggregation of employment trends by industrial sector, major occupational groups 
or levels of qualifications. Changes in classifications of one of the three key variables 
create additional problems with deriving coherent time trends within detailed 
subgroups.  
A major additional data source which has also found its way into the forecasting 
of skill needs is the use of representative surveys among firms. However, only very 
few countries make systematic use of this data source, either because of an 
insufficient number of years for which such data are available or because of deficient 
depth of information on skill levels and changes of employee skills. Some hints of 
how these data can usefully be applied to enrich the forecasts are demonstrated by 
Barnow (2002). 
We shall now compare some institutional features of the forecasting efforts 
across the range of countries. In the majority of countries the forecasts are carried 
out by independent research institutes that receive additional funds for their regular 
forecasting activities. In Canada, France, Germany and Japan, research institutes 
affiliated with the ministry of labour or charged with the collection and publishing of 
statistical information and research reports take responsibility for producing and 
disseminating the results of the forecasts. In the United States, for example, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics is an agency within the U.S. Department of Labor and 
publishes the very detailed Occupational Outlook, which is also available online. 
Funding for the forecasts often comes from one single ministry, usually the ministry 
of employment, but in a few instances there is also funding from national institutions 
that are charged with decision-making or the administration of active labour market 
policies. Whereas the former approach usually ensures a large dissemination of 
results and wider policy debates, the latter form of funding appears to favour the 
internal use of the forecasts for administrative purposes and decisions on how to 
channel available funds to achieve specific policy targets.  
Particularly in Europe the use of forecasting results seems to be still rather 
limited to government officials, expert groups, social partners and professional 
associations. Because of the scarce availability of attractive online facilities to consult 
forecasting results, use by individuals interested in learning about economic 
restructuring, occupational orientation or career guidance with up-to-date information 
is quite rare. Delays in providing printed material to the public at large are substantial, 
and most likely there are few additional efforts that would suffice to satisfy an 
apparently large demand by individuals for this information. The North American 
efforts in this direction can serve as best-practice examples: for example, the search 
facilities of the Occupational Outlook Handbook for the United States 
(http://stats.bls.gov/oco/home.htm) or for Canada (http://www.jobfutures.ca). 
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Just as important as the preparation of the forecasts are the processes of 
implementation, that is, what kind of reactions there are to the additional knowledge 
gained through the forecasts. To put it in simple terms: if the weather forecasts 
announce heavy rain and, as a likely consequence, floods, it is important that 
preventive actions should follow. Ideally the forecast would help to limit the negative 
consequences, such as damages; just to have the forecast results without some form 
of ensuing action is clearly not enough. We call this process the implementation of 
forecasts. In the case of forecasts of skill needs we would like to see a similar chain 
of reactions induced by the publishing of such forecasts.  
A cross-country comparison seems to indicate two types of ‘organized’ reactions. 
The United States, Canada and Great Britain focus in their implementation first on a 
kind of regional responsibility for implementing reactions to counter, for example, skill 
shortages. The other countries with a more corporatist tradition and governance 
structure also get the employers’ organizations and trade unions, the so-called social 
partners, involved at a very early stage. In countries where general education 
(Germany), further training (France) or lifelong learning is the responsibility of or 
under the autonomy of the regions, regional committees are involved in discussing 
and drawing conclusions based on the national and, in some cases, additional 
regional forecasts. The co-financing of active labour market policies in the European 
Union through the European Social Fund and the community initiative EQUAL has 
given a new impetus to the forecasting activities, particularly on the regional level.  
Some special features of countries’ forecasting models deserve mention. In 
Canada and in Denmark a systematic approach to checking between national 
forecasts and the aggregation of results for regional forecasts is applied, which 
allows for the early identification of regional imbalances in these countries. To the 
best of our knowledge Ireland is still the only country that produces forecasts that 
systematically differentiate between men and women. Some countries that apply a 
deeply disaggregated occupational classification indirectly come close to the same 
result because of persistent gender segregation into occupational groups. With the 
political emphasis on equal treatment and equal opportunities for women and men in 
the current employment guidelines of the European Union, more countries might 
apply this specification in coming years.  
We stressed the importance of the wide dissemination of forecasting results 
earlier in this essay. This is indeed a crucial point. If forecasts remain accessible only 
to experts in the field, the transmission process required so that large numbers of 
individuals can adapt to coming changes will take too much time. Individuals need 
up-to-date information to make their occupational choices upon entry into the labour 
force as well as throughout their occupational or employment careers. After all, it 
does not help much to kill the messenger for bringing the news of a lost battle, that is, 
to blame forecasters for having brought the message of continued structural change 
and growing shares of service sector jobs. It is through millions of individual 
decisions that smooth forms of structural adjustment are achieved.  
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Even though the forecasting models presented here allow disaggregate 
occupational forecasts to fairly small groups of occupations and across educational 
levels, and, as in the case of the United States, some efforts have been made to 
predict skill needs directly, there remains a fairly large unknown because changes in 
the occupational structure revealed in the forecasts cannot perfectly be matched to 
changes in the skill composition of the labour force. The whole issue of how skills are 
related to types of education and occupations, including the measurement of skills, 
has only recently started to attract the interest of researchers (see, for example, the 
special issue in the Oxford Economic Papers on skills measurement and economic 
analysis, edited by Borghans, Green and Mayhew, 2001). This does not make 
forecasts an inappropriate tool from which policymakers cannot gain information. 
Rather, it requires scholars to extend the existing models and complement 
occupational forecasts with skill requirement studies.  
In this essay we opted for a transatlantic comparison of forecasting and 
implementation Certainly, we would have liked to include more countries in the 
comparison—some Scandinavian countries, in particular, have interesting 
approaches to offer in this respect—but we were not always successful in identifying 
suitable presentations of national models or obtaining English translations within our 
budget constraints. We apologise for this neglect, but can only advise the reader to 
directly contact the responsible institutes in these countries via the continuously 
updated forecasting homepage of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) 
http://www.wz-berlin.de/amb/ab/qb/qb.en.htm.  
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